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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
PERSPECTIVE ON GRUTTER AND GRATZ 
David Weissbrodt* 
There is an international human rights law aspect to Grutter 
v. Bollinger1 and Gratz v. Bollinger that might be missed by 
many lawyers and scholars who rarely consider any legal domain 
beyond the limits of the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, Grutter and 
Gratz reflect a trend in Supreme Court opinions to use interna-
tional human rights sources in interpreting the Constitution. 
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Grutter relies upon 
international human rights law in noting that 
[t]he Court's observation that race-conscious programs must 
have a logical end point, accords with the international under-
standing ... of affirmative action. The International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, ratified by the United States in 1994 ... instructs [that 
affirmative action measures] "shall in no case entail as a con-
sequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for 
different racial groups after the objectives for which they were 
taken have been achieved. "3 
In Grutter Justice Ginsburg also cited Article 4(1) of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women,4 which provides for affirmative action, but limits such spe-
* Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University or Minnesota. The author is 
grateful for the assistance of Mark P. Lindberg and Mary Rumsey in researching this article. 
I. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). As discussed in detail by other contributors to this symposium: 
After being denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School, Gruttcr, a white stu-
dent, sued on the basis that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race. The 
case challenged the validity or the school's aflirmative action program in admissions. The 
Court found that the law school's program did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antee of equal protection and that diversity was a sufliciently compelling interest that permit-
ted the use of race in admissions programs of the type used by the law school. 
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Gratz involved a challenge to the affirmative action pro-
gram for the undergraduates at the University of Michigan. The Supreme Court found 
that the program was not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest in diversity and 
therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 
3. Cruller, 539 U.S. at 344. 
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
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cial measures to the length of time required to achieve the goal of 
de facto equality. Furthermore, in her dissenting opinion in Gratz, 
Justice Ginsburg referred to her use of international law in Grutter. 
In distinguishing between invidious and remedial discrimination, 
she states that "[c)ontemporary human rights documents draw just 
this line; they distinguish between policies of oppression and meas-
ures designed to accelerate de facto equality. "5 
In supporting affirmative action, Justice Ginsburg appropri-
ately relied upon the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention),6 
which has been ratified by the United States and 168 other na-
tions, that is, over three quarters of the countries in the world. 
By ratifying the Race Convention the United States has commit-
ted itself under Article 5 "to prohibit and to eliminate racial dis-
crimination in all its forms" 7 and to provide under Article 2 for 
affirmative action so long as such special measures are required. 8 
The Race Convention authorized the Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (Race Committee) to review 
compliance with the treaty's provisions. The Clinton Administra-
G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981. 
5. Gratz, 539 U.S. at302. 
6. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 
(1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. The Race Convention was signed 
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, submitted to the U.S. Senate by President Jimmy 
Carter in 1978, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate on June 24, 1994 (140 Cong. 
Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994)), and ratified by the United States on October 21, 
1994, with three reservations, one understanding, one declaration, and one proviso. Justice 
Ginsburg may have been responding to an amicus brief submitted on behalf of Human 
Rights Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center urging the Court 
to consider such international sources. Brief of Amici Curiae, Human Rights Advocates 
and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center in Support of Respondents, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516) 
(2003) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/center/delavega.pdf. 
7. Race Convention, supra note 6, Art. 5. 
8. /d. Art. 2(2): " States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in 
the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure 
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belong-
ing to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a conse-
quence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the 
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved." The World Conference 
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance called 
upon "States to establish, on the basis of statistical information, national programmes, 
including affirmative or positive measures, to promote the access of groups of individuals 
who arc or may be victims of racial discrimination to basic social services, including pri-
mary education, basic health care and adequate housing." Programme of Action 25, 43 
'1100 in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2001). See also Marc Bossuyt, The Concept and prac-
tice of affirmative action, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/21 (2002). 
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tion submitted9 and the Bush Administration presented 10 the 
first U.S. report to Race Committee in which the U.S. identified 
several federal statutes and regulations that provide for affirma-
tive action. In its concluding observations on the U.S. report the 
Race Committee "emphasize[ d) that the adoption of special 
measures by States parties, when the circumstances so warrant, 
such as in the case of persistent disparities, is an obligation 
stemming from article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention." 11 
Justice Ginsburg could also have referred to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,12 by which the U.S. 
and 150 other nations have pledged to "prohibit any discrimina-
tion and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race .... " 13 The 
Covenant established the Human Rights Committee, which re-
viewed the first U.S. report and concluded, inter alia: 
The Committee emphasizes the need for the Government to 
increase its efforts to prevent and eliminate persisting dis-
criminatory attitudes and prejudices against persons belong-
ing to minority groups and women including, where appropri-
ate, through the adoption of affirmative action. State 
legislation which is not yet in full compliance with the non-
discrimination articles of the Covenant should be brought sys-
tematically into line with them as soon as possible. 14 
Lest one gets the impression that Justice Ginsburg is the 
only justice of the Supreme Court that is aware of these interna-
tional legal sources, one should also refer to the learning process 
reflected by the Court's experience in regard to discrimination 
against homosexuals. In Bowers v. Hardwick 15 the Supreme 
Court held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right 
9. United States, Initial Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (Sept. 2000), http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/cenl_reporU 
ccrd_report.pdf (visited Jan. 18, 2004). 
I 0. Michael E. Parmly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of De-
mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Remarks to the Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Geneva. Switzerland. Aug. 3, 2lXll, http://www.state.gov/g/ 
drVrl£/rml200114485.htm (visited Jan. 18, 2004). 
II. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/59/Misc.17/Rev.3 (2001), 
para. 20. 
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.NT.S. 171, entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
13. !d. Art. 26. 
14. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of 
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.SO (1995) 5, V9. 
15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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to engage in consensual, adult, homosexual conduct. In a concur-
ring opinion, Chief Justice Burger explained: 
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have 
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of 
Western Civilization. Condemnation of those practices is 
firmly rooted in Judea-Christian moral and ethical standards. 
Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law 
and the Western Christian Tradition .... To hold that the act 
of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamen-
tal right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching. 16 
The Supreme Court failed in Bowers even to cite Dudgeon 
v. United Kingdom 17 in which the European Court of Human 
Rights had five years earlier held that an individual's fear of 
prosecution for male homosexual conduct constituted an unjusti-
fied interference with his right to respect for his private life. On 
June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 18 re-
versed Bowers and Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
corrected Chief Justice Burger's statement: 
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the his-
tory of Western civilization and to Judea-Christian moral and 
ethical standards did not take account of other authorities 
pointing in an opposite direction .... Of even more impor-
tance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels 
to Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident in 
Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who 
desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The 
laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged 
that he had been questioned, his home had been searched, 
and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that the 
laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 
45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981) par. 52. Authoritative in all countries 
that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 
45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in 
16. /d. at 196-97. 
17. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.A) (1982), 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
149 (1981). 
18. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). International human rights law issues 
with respect to the right to privacy for consensual homosexual conduct were brought to 
the attention of the Supreme Court by Brief of Amici Curiae, Mary Robinson, Amnesty 
International U.S.A, Human Rights Watch, Intcrights, the Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights in support of Petitioners, Law-
rence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (No. 02-1020) (2003), http://www.lchr.org/media/lawrence_ 
texas_amici.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2004). 
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Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our 
Western civilization. 19 
279 
Another recent example of how international law and prac-
tice can be relevant to at least some justices can be found in the 
Supreme Court's June 20, 2002, decision in Atkins v. Virginia.20 
In holding that executions of mentally retarded criminals are 
"cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment, Justice Stevens supported the decision of six jus-
tices by noting that "within the world community, the imposition 
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded 
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented observing, "I fail 
to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the 
punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court's 
ultimate determination. "21 
Another positive example can be found in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,22 in which a four-judge plurality of the Supreme 
Court ruled that the death sentence for an offender who was 15 
at the time of the crime constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. In the opinion, Jus-
tice Stevens cited international authorities in reasoning that the 
death penalty would "offend civilized standards of decency. "23 
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor in a 
separate decision referred to international treaties ratified or 
signed by the U.S. that explicitly prohibit juvenile death penal-
ties, including the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
19. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481. 
20. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002). International human rights law issues 
with respect to the execution of retarded persons were brought to the attention of the 
Supreme Court, Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(No. {X)-8727) (2002). http://www.intemationaljusticeproject.org/pdfslcmccarver.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2004). 
21. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n. 21. The dissenting opinion continued, "While it is true 
that some of our prior opinions have looked to 'the climate of international opinion,' 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (in which the Supreme Court found the death 
penalty for rape to be cruel and unusual punishment), to reinforce a conclusion regarding 
evolving standards of decency, sec Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) 
(plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion); we have since explicitly rejected the idea that the sen-
tencing practices of other countries could "serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment 
prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our people." [citing the Supreme Court's 
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n. 1 (1989)] (emphasizing that 
"American conceptions of decency ... arc dispositive") (emphasis in original); Atkins, 
536 U.S. at325 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
22. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Defense for Children 
International-USA, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169). 
23. Thompson, 487 U.S. at830. 
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American Convention on Human Rights/4 and the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War.25 
One year after Thompson, however, the Supreme Court 
concluded in Stanford v. Kentuck/6 that the death penalty for a 
crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age does not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. Writing for the five-judge major-
ity, Justice Scalia rejected the relevance of international law and 
practices of other countries as a guide to construing the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court noted that where "the practices of other 
nations ... can be relevant to determining whether a practice ... 
occupies a place ... in our Constitution, ... they cannot serve to 
establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the prac-
tice is accepted among our people. "27 
So as one can see from this exchange, there is a difference 
of opinion on the Supreme Court of the United States as to the 
relevance of international law and practice in deciding Eighth 
Amendment cases, but one can say at least that when the Court 
is disposed to accept an Eighth Amendment argument, it has 
used whatever international law and practice might support its 
view. Looking at these cases more broadly from Bowers through 
Grutter one can see that the Supreme Court has haltingly devel-
oped a practice of referring to pertinent international human 
rights law when their attention is drawn28 to the relevance of in-
ternational principles and practice. The justices of the Supreme 
Court evidently do not like to find that the U.S. approach to 
human rights issues is different from the prevailing view in the 
world. Justice Ginsburg explained her perspective in Grutter and 
Gratz when she noted that some of the justices of the Supreme 
24. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/11.71 doc.6 rev.l at 25 (1988). 
25. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 75 U .N.T.S. 287, Art. 68, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. 
26. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See Briefs of Amici Curiae Amnesty 
International and the International Human Rights Law Group, Wilkins v. Missouri, affd 
sub nom. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-5765, 87-6026). But see 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Kentucky et al., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 
87-5765, 87-6026) (opposing use of international law). The U.S. Supreme Court has de-
cided to re-consider this issue. See note Error! Bookmark not defined. and related text, 
infra. 
27. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.l. 
28. The Supreme Court received amicus curiae briefs relating to human rights is-
sues in Atkins, Grutter, Gratz, and Lawrence, but apparently not in Bowers. See supra 
notes 5, 17, 19. 
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Court are "becoming more open to comparative and interna-
tional law perspectives. "29 
As Justice O'Connor has observed, 
Although international law and the law of other nations are 
rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions 
reached by other countries and by the international commu-
nity should at times constitute persuasive authority in Ameri-
can courts .... While ultimately we must bear responsibility 
for interpreting our own laws, there is much to learn from 
other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the 
same difficult issues that we face here. 30 
Similarly, Justice Breyer said: 
Judges in different countries increasingly apply somewhat 
similar legal phrases to somewhat similar circumstances, for 
example in respect to multi-racial populations, growing immi-
gration, economic demands, environmental concerns, modern 
technologies, and instantaneous media communication. Thus, 
it is not surprising to find that the European Court of Human 
Rights has issued decisions involving, for example, campaign 
finance laws and free expression or that the Supreme Court of 
India has written extensively about "affirmativ~ action." 31 
While the Court and individual Justices talk about their in-
creasing willingness to use international law as a tool for inter-
preting broad or vague principles such as "equal protection," 
"due process," "affirmative action," and "cruel and unusual pun-
29. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address to American Constitution Society National Con-
vention, Aug. 2003. While the Suprcmc Court did not mention intcrnatiunallaw in its opin-
ion in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), historians who interviewed thc 
judges and lawyers in the case tell us that the Court was particularly motivated by the inter-
national embarrassment the United States Government had suffered in the early 1950s 
when ambassadors from African nations had been excluded from restaurants, restrooms, 
and other places of public accommodations in the Washington, D.C. area. The justices of 
the Supreme Court were persuaded by those publicized incidents that they must begin the 
process of ending racial segregation in the United States. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR 
CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE !~AGE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (2000); AZZA LAYTOI', 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS A:>D CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1941-1960 
(2000); Doug McAdam, On the International Origi!ZS of Domestic Political Opportunity 
Structures, in SOCIAL \IOVE~ENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIO:>S 251-67 
(Anne Costain & Andrew McFarland eds.,1998). 
30. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-sixth Annual Meel-
ing of 1he American Socie1y of lmernaliona/ Law, 96 A~. Soc'y INT'L. L. PROC. 348, 350 
(2002). 
31. Stephen Breyer, The Supreme Court and 1he New lmernalional Law, Address 
Before 1he Ninety-sevemh Annual Meeting of the Sociely of lmernalional Law (Apr. 4, 
2003), http://www.suprcmccourtus.gov/publicinfo/spccchcs/sp_04-04-03.html (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2003). 
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ishments," that interpretive approach could be more forcefully 
sustained by Article VI of the U.S. Constitution which says that 
treaties, together with federal statutes are the "the supreme Law 
of the Land. "32 Accordingly at least in principle, an earlier fed-
eral statute, a state constitutional provision, or a state law must 
yield to an inconsistent treaty. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has sought to integrate treaties into 
the domestic legal order. For example, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that "an Act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construc-
tion remains .... "33 Further, in The Paquete Habana, 34 the Su-
preme Court has addressed the power of courts to enforce 
customary international law. In invalidating the wartime seizure 
of fishing vessels as contrary to the law of nations, the Court ob-
served: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts. "35 Where no treaty or 
other legal authority is controlling, resort must be had to the cus-
toms of nations. 
Nonetheless, U.S. judges have, with a few exceptions, gener-
ally exhibited great reticence in applying Article Ill's Supremacy 
Clause to treaties36 and in making more general use of interna-
tional standards in their decisions and have even appeared igno-
rant as to the application of international law. Former Supreme 
Court Justice Harry Blackmun criticized the Court's opinions of 
his time as showing "something less than a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind" and that "at best, the Supreme Court en-
forces some principles of international law and some of its obliga-
tions some of the times."37 
32. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2. 
33. [Murray v. Schooner] The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), 
quoted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); see also Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 
815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000) ("we generally construe Congressional legislation to avoid violat-
ing international law." (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982))), affirmed sub 
nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2(Kll). 
34. The Paquctc Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
35. /d. at 700. 
36. It is beyond the scope of this brief article to discuss the excuses courts have devel-
oped to avoid applying treaties; for example, courts often find that treaties arc not self-
executing. 
37. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, ASIL NEWSL. (American Society of Int'l Law, Wash., 
D.C.), Mar.-May 19941,6. One example of such a failure was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) in which the Court upheld an executive order authorizing the sum-
mary return of boat people to Haiti and found that the order did not violate Article 33 of the 
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force Oct. 4, 
1967. Another example was Brcard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), in which the Supreme 
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Judicial reluctance to use or ignorance about international 
human rights standards is inconsistent with the status of the 
United States as a powerful and influential nation, which at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century has become the world's 
sole Superpower. The economic and political influence of the 
United States has inspired other governments and peoples to 
emulate its democracy, its economic system, and its methods for 
protecting human rights. Its prominent position in the world 
community and dominance of the world's media have made the 
U.S. both the most visible nation-even as to its human rights 
problems-and at the same time has allowed it to ignore most 
international criticism. 
While the U.S. encourages universal standards and resists 
arguments for cultural relativism from Asian and Islamic 
sources, it relies upon U.S. particularities in explaining its use of 
the death penalty (even for juvenile offenders), the large per-
centage of the U.S. population in prison, the profuse distribution 
of small arms in the population, many homeless living in the 
streets of U.S. cities, the failure of the U.S. to become a State 
party to such broadly ratified human rights treaties as the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, the attempt by the U.S. to 
withdraw its signature from the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the campaign by the U.S. against the ap-
plication of the ICC in other countries, the prolonged detention 
and ill-treatment of detainees suspected of terrorism, and mili-
tary actions against other nations inconsistent with UN Charter 
and other provisions of international law. 
The advent of a new willingness by the Supreme Court to 
consider international human rights law is in the process of being 
tested as this article goes to press in August 2004. During its 
2003-04 term the Court granted certiorari on several highly con-
troversial cases in which there could be significant international 
legal issues and applicable international norms. In the most visi-
ble of those cases, Rasu/ v. Bush,38 the Supreme Court held that 
the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, provided jurisdic-
Court failed to comply with the International Court of Justice provisional measures to delay 
executions of accused who had not been accorded their right to be informed of consular assis-
tance under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 5% U.N.T.S. 261, entered into 
force March 19, 1967. On March 31, 2004, the International Court of Justice decided that the 
United States had similarly breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention in the case 
of 51 Mexican nationals who had been tried and sentenced to death without having been in-
formed of their right to consular assistance. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. 
United States of America), March 31,2004, 43l.L.M. 581 (2lXJ4). 
38. 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2686 (2004). 
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tion for twelve Kuwaiti citizens and two Australian nationals 
captured in Afghanistan to challenge their detention at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The Court avoided any 
constitutional or international law issues at stake in the case. 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain39 the Supreme Court was com-
pelled to refer to international human rights law in construing 28 
U.S.C. § 1350, which gives the district courts "original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 
The Court relied upon § 702 of the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States (1987) which provides 
that a state policy of "prolonged arbitrary detention" violates 
customary international law.40 Even though the "arbitrary ar-
rest" claim in the Alvarez-Machain case failed, the Court indi-
cated that § 1350 would sustain claims for "violations of any in-
ternational law norm with [a) definite content and acceptance 
among civilized nations .... "4 
The Court decided in Hamdi v. Rumsfel~2 that procedural 
due process under the Constitution required that a United States 
citizen originally captured in Afghanistan cannot be detained in-
definitely by the U.S. Government on the ground that he is an 
"enemy combatant" without a meaningful opportunity to contest 
his detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The Supreme 
Court has also decided to consider the indeterminate detention 
of Mariel Cubans43 as well as whether the execution of juveniles 
who committed murder at age 16 or 17 violates the prohibition 
of "cruel and unusual punishments" in the Eighth Amendment.44 
39. 124 S Ct. 2739 (2004). In United States v. Alvarcz-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 
(1992), the Supreme Court narrowly construed an extradition treaty between the United 
States and Mexico, so as to permit the prosecution in California of a Mexican doctor who 
had been kidnapped from his country and transported to the U.S. by Mexican police act-
ing in cooperation with U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents. The Court re-
fused to interpret the treaty in light of customary international law, which prohibits the 
action of one state on the territory of another state. Instead, it concluded that the kid-
napping violated neither U.S. law nor the U.S.-Mcxico extradition treaty. In the subse-
quent criminal trial the doctor was found not guilty and he then sued the U.S. and Mexi-
can authorities in U.S. courts under the Alien Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350. 
40. /d. at 2745. 
41. /d. at 2766. 
42. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
43. Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), ccrt. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1143 
(2004) (No. 03-7434). 
44. State ex rei. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, Roper 
v. Simmons, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (U.S. Jan 26, 2004) (No. 03-633). 
